Optimal Differentially Private Mechanisms for Randomised Response by Holohan, Naoise et al.
1Optimal Differentially Private Mechanisms for
Randomised Response
Naoise Holohan, Douglas J. Leith, Oliver Mason
Abstract
We examine a generalised Randomised Response (RR) technique in the context of differential
privacy and examine the optimality of such mechanisms. Strict and relaxed differential privacy are
considered for binary outputs. By examining the error of a statistical estimator, we present closed
solutions for the optimal mechanism(s) in both cases. The optimal mechanism is also given for the
specific case of the original RR technique as introduced by Warner in 1965.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Stanley L. Warner first proposed the Randomised Response (RR) technique as a means to
eliminate bias in surveying in 1965 [31]. Respondents would be handed a spinner by the surveyor
to decide which of two questions the respondent would answer, for example,
1) Have you ever cheated on your spouse/partner?
2) Have you always been faithful to your spouse/partner?
Respondents would spin the spinner in private and answer the given question truthfully with
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Respondents would be afforded plausible deniability as the surveyor would not
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2know the question to which the answer refers. This would encourage respondents to engage with
the survey and answer the question truthfully. The spinner can be replaced by any appropriate
randomisation device, such as coin flips, dice or drawing from a pack of cards.
A rich body of literature now exists on RR. The inefficiencies of Warner’s original RR model
have been examined by a number of authors and many new RR models have been proposed. These
include the unrelated question model [13], the forced response model [2], Moor’s procedure [26]
and two-stage RR models [25], [24]. More comprehensive lists of RR models can be found in
[21], [1].
RR is actively used in surveying when asking questions of a sensitive nature. Examples include
surveys on doping and drug use in elite athletes [27], cognitive-enhancing drug use among
university students [5], faking on a CV [6], corruption [11], sexual behaviour [3], and child
molestation [8].
Researchers remain divided on the effectiveness of RR. While some works have shown RR
to be an improvement on different survey techniques, including direct questioning (where no
randomisation is involved), [29], [12], [22], [20], [28], others remain sceptical on its advantage
[32], [33], [23]. Public trust in RR has also been shown to be lacking [4].
Separately, differential privacy has emerged as a model of interest in privacy-preserving
data publishing since being presented in 2006 [7]. Differential privacy gives a quantitative
mathematical definition to measure the level of privacy achieved in a given data release. This
definition determines the amount of manipulation that needs to be applied to the data to achieve
the desired level of privacy. Under differential privacy, privacy is quantified by how statistically
indistinguishable the privacy-preserved outputs from two similar datasets are.
When applied to randomised response, where the output from a single individual is binary, dif-
ferential privacy requires the output from any two individuals to be statistically indistinguishable,
to a specified degree.
B. Our Results
In this paper we examine a generalisation of Warner’s original RR technique, and establish
conditions under which such a model satisfies differential privacy. By calculating the estimator
of minimal variance, we determine the optimal differentially private RR mechanism. We examine
strict -differential privacy and relaxed (,δ)-differential privacy. Complete solutions for the
3optimal mechanisms are presented for both cases. The optimal mechanism is also given for
Warner’s RR model satisfying (, δ)-differential privacy.
C. Related Work
The application of differential privacy to randomised response has been limited to date.
[30] examined using randomised response to differentially privately collect data, although their
analysis only considered strict -differential privacy and a comparison of its efficiency with
respect to the Laplace mechanism, a mechanism popular in the differential privacy literature.
Randomised response has been used in conjunction with differential privacy in a more general
context in the form of local privacy, also known as input perturbation. For example, extreme
mechanisms for local differential privacy have been studied in [18], [16], while differential
privacy was applied to social network data in the form of graphs with randomised response in
[19]. Outside randomised response and local privacy, optimal mechanisms in differential privacy
have received some attention, including work on strict differential privacy [10] and relaxed
differential privacy [9].
D. Structure of Paper
We begin in Section II with an introduction to the Randomised Response (RR) technique, and
derive the statistical estimator and associated bias and error; we also present Warner’s original
RR model. We introduce differential privacy in Section III and present a number of preliminary
results for later use in Section IV.
The main results are given in Sections V, VI and VII, relating to strict differential privacy,
relaxed differential privacy and Warner’s model respectively. Concluding remarks are given in
Section VIII.
II. RANDOMISED RESPONSE
A. Introduction
We are looking to determine the proportion pi of people in the population possessing a
particular sensitive attribute, where possession of the attribute is binary. We conduct a survey
on n individuals of the population by uniform random sampling with replacement.
4A single respondent’s answer Xi ∈ {0, 1} is a randomised version of their truthful answer xi ∈
{0, 1}, in order to protect their privacy. The randomised response will therefore not definitively
reveal a respondent’s truthful answer. By convention, a value of 1 denotes possession of the
sensitive attribute, while 0 denotes that the respondent does not possess the attribute. We denote
by N the number of randomised responses that return 1, hence N =
∑
i∈[n] Xi where [n] =
[1, n] ∩ Z. We are therefore looking to estimate pi from N
n
.
B. Generalised RR Model
In keeping with standard notation, (Ω,F ,P) denotes a probability space. Xi : Ω → {0, 1}
is then a random variable for each i ∈ [n], dependent on the truthful value xi. We define the
randomised response mechanism by
P(Xi = k | xi = j) = pjk, (1)
which leads us to defining the design matrix of the mechanism as follows.
Definition 1 (Design Matrix). A randomised response mechanism as defined in (1) is uniquely
determined by its design matrix,
P =
 p00 p01
p10 p11
 .
For the probability mass functions of each Xi to sum to 1, we require p00 + p01 = 1 and
p10 + p11 = 1. The design matrix therefore simplifies to
P =
 p00 1− p00
1− p11 p11
 , (2)
where p00, p11 ∈ [0, 1].
As pi is the true proportion of individuals in the population possessing the sensitive attribute,
we can calculate the probability mass function of each Xi:
P(Xi = 0) = (1− pi)p00 + pi(1− p11)
= p00 − pi(p00 + p11 − 1),
(3a)
P(Xi = 1) = pip11 + (1− pi)(1− p00)
= 1− p00 + pi(p00 + p11 − 1).
(3b)
Remark: Direct questioning corresponds to the case where p00 = p11 = 1.
5C. Estimator, Bias and Error
Having presented the RR mechanism previously, we now need to establish an estimator of pi
from the parameters of the mechanism, p00 and p11, and from the distribution of randomised re-
sponses, namely N
n
. We first establish a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for the mechanism
and then examine its bias and error.
Theorem 1. Let p00 + p11 6= 1. Then the MLE for pi of the randomised response mechanism
given by (2) is
Πˆ(p00, p11) =
p00 − 1
p00 + p11 − 1 +
N
(p00 + p11 − 1)n. (4)
Proof: Let us first index the sample so that Xi = 1 for each i ≤ N , and Xi = 0 for each
i > N . Then the likelihood L of the sample is
L = P(Xi = 1)NP(Xi = 0)n−N .
The log-likelihood is
log(L) = N logP(Xi = 1) + (n−N) logP(Xi = 0),
whose derivatives are
∂ log(L)
∂pi
=
N
P(Xi = 1)
∂P(Xi = 1)
∂pi
+
n−N
P(Xi = 0)
∂P(Xi = 0)
∂pi
,
∂2 log(L)
∂pi2
= − N
P(Xi = 1)2
(
∂P(Xi = 1)
∂pi
)2
− n−N
P(Xi = 0)2
(
∂P(Xi = 0)
∂pi
)2
.
We note that ∂
2 log(L)
∂pi2
< 0, hence the maximum of log(L) occurs when ∂ log(L)
∂pi
= 0. Solving for
pi completes the proof.
We note the following standard identity in probability and statistics,
Var(Y ) = E[Y 2]− E[Y ]2, (5)
for any random variable Y . We now calculate the bias and error of Πˆ. We use the variance of the
estimator to characterise error in line with conventional practice. Similarly by convention, we
characterise the bias of an estimator as its expected deviation from the quantity it is estimating
(i. e. E[Πˆ− pi]). We remind the reader of the dependence of Var(pˆi) on pi by writing Var(Πˆ|pi).
6Corollary 1. The MLE Πˆ constructed in Theorem 1 is unbiased and has error
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) =
1
4
− (p00 − 12 − pi(p00 + p11 − 1))2
(p00 + p11 − 1)2n . (6)
Proof: Since the survey we are conducting is by uniform random sampling with replacement,
N is a sum of independent and identically distributed random variables. Therefore, E[N ] =
nE[Xi] and Var(N) = nVar(Xi).
Since Xi ∈ {0, 1}, it can be shown that E[Xi] = E[X2i ] = P(Xi = 1) = 1 − p00 + pi(p00 +
p11 − 1). Hence,
E[Πˆ] =
p00 − 1
p00 + p11 − 1 +
E[N ]
(p00 + p11 − 1)n
=
p00 − 1
p00 + p11 − 1 +
E[Xi]
p00 + p11 − 1
= pi,
and so Πˆ is unbiased as claimed.
Secondly,
Var(Πˆ|pi) = Var(N)
(p00 + p11 − 1)2n2
=
Var(Xi)
(p00 + p11 − 1)2n
=
E[X2i ]− E[Xi]2
(p00 + p11 − 1)2n
=
P(Xi = 1)P(Xi = 0)
(p00 + p11 − 1)2n ,
which can be simplified to (6).
When conducting a survey on a population, it is often useful and necessary to estimate the
margin of error of the estimate on a sample. For a confidence level c ∈ [0, 1], the margin of
error of a sample is given by ω ≥ 0, where
P(|Πˆ− pi| ≤ ω) ≥ c. (7a)
In practical applications, a 95% confidence interval is typically used [17]. In the absence of any
additional information on the distribution of Πˆ, Chebyshev’s inequality can be used to derive a
general, but conservative, margin of error, assuming Πˆ has finite variance. In such a scenario,
7the margin of error of a sample is given to be 4.5σ, where the standard deviation σ is given by√
Var(Πˆ|pi), since
P
(
|Πˆ− pi| ≤ 4.5
√
Var(Πˆ|pi)
)
≥ 0.95. (7b)
In many practical situations, the central limit theorem is invoked to determine heuristically a
margin of error. For a random variable G that is normally distributed with mean µ and variance
σ2, we have
P(|G− µ| ≤ 1.96σ) ≥ 0.95, (7c)
hence 1.96σ is typically taken as the margin of error in such scenarios [17]. However, this
non-rigorous approach only gives a loose representation of the margin of error, given that the
guarantee of the central limit theorem only applies in the limit as the sample size n approaches
infinity.
Due to this variability in defining the margin of error of a sample, we only focus on determining
the error of the estimator, Var(Πˆ|pi), in this paper. This error can be used to calculate the margin
of error for a particular application, as outlined above.
D. Warner’s RR model
Warner’s model [31] is a specific case of the generalised model introduced in Section II-B.
Warner proposed that surveyors would present respondents with a spinner which they would
spin in private to decide which one of two questions to answer. The spinner would point to a
question (e. g. “Have you ever cheated on your spouse/partner?”) with probability pw, and to the
complement of that question (e. g. “Have you always been faithful to your spouse/partner?”) with
probability 1− pw. Respondents would then be asked to answer the chosen question truthfully,
but without revealing which question they were answering. As before, xi denotes the truthful
response of respondent i, while Xi denotes the randomised response, as determined by the
process outlined above.
Warner’s model corresponds to the case where p00 = p11 = pw. We denote by Pw the design
matrix of Warner’s model, which is given by
Pw =
 pw 1− pw
1− pw pw
 ,
8while the probability mass function of each Xi is defined as
P(Xi = 0) = pw − pi(2pw − 1),
P(Xi = 1) = 1− pw + pi(2pw − 1).
Using the same unbiased MLE in (4), we denote by Πˆw the estimator for Warner’s model
and, by (6), find its error to be
Var(Πˆw(pw)|pi) =
1
4
− (pw − 12 − pi(2pw − 1))2
(2pw − 1)2n . (8)
III. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy was first proposed by Dwork in 2006 [7] as a way to measure the level of
privacy achieved when publishing data. Using the same notation as in [14], we denote by Dm
the space of all m-row datasets (let D be the space of each row) and by d ∈ Dm a dataset in
this space. We then denote by Xd : Ω→ Dn a randomised version of d.
If D is assumed to be discrete, the mechanism Xd is said to satisfy (,δ)-differential privacy
if
P(Xd ∈ A) ≤ eP(Xd′ ∈ A) + δ, (9)
for each d,d′ ∈ Dm that differ in exactly one row (i. e. there exists exactly one j ∈ [m] such
that dj 6= d′j) and for each subset A ⊂ Dm.
This set-up simplifies in the case of randomised response introduced in Section II. Firstly,
the datasets contain only one row (m = 1), and the row-space is {0, 1}. We are therefore
only required to show that (9) holds for d 6= d′ ∈ {0, 1} and for A = {0}, {1}. Formally,
(,δ)-differential privacy is satisfied if
P(Xi = j) ≤ eP(Xk = j) + δ, (10)
for any i, k ∈ [n] and j ∈ {0, 1}.
For the RR mechanism given by (2) to satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy, we require the
9following to hold:
p11 ≤ e(1− p00) + δ, (11a)
p00 ≤ e(1− p11) + δ, (11b)
1− p00 ≤ ep11 + δ,
1− p11 ≤ ep00 + δ.
We can now define the set of pairs (p00, p11) that correspond to a RR mechanism which
satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
Definition 2 (Region of Feasibility). A RR mechanism, given by (2), satisfies (, δ)-differential
privacy if (p00, p11) ∈ R, where R ⊂ R2 is defined as
R =

(p00, p11) ∈ R2 :
p00, p11 ∈ [0, 1],
p00 ≤ e(1− p11) + δ,
p11 ≤ e(1− p00) + δ,
1− p11 ≤ ep00 + δ,
1− p00 ≤ ep11 + δ.

. (12)
We consider the case where p00 +p11 > 1. Note that the estimator error, and hence the optimal
mechanism, is undefined when p00 + p11 = 1. If p00 + p11 < 1, we permute all responses such
that X ′i = 1−Xi. This corresponds to the columns of the design matrix being swapped, giving
p′00 = 1− p00 and p′11 = 1− p11, hence p′00 + p′11 = 2− p00 − p11 > 1. We can therefore assume
p00 + p11 > 1 without loss of generality.
When p00 + p11 > 1, we note that (i) 1 − p11 < p00 ≤ e(1 − p11) + δ < ep00 + δ and (ii)
1− p00 < p11 ≤ e(1− p00) + δ < ep11 + δ. Hence, the region of feasibility simplifies to R′ as
follows:
R′ = {(p00, p11) ∈ R : p00 + p11 > 1}
=

(p00, p11) ∈ R :
p00, p11 ≤ 1,
p00 + p11 > 1,
p00 ≤ e(1− p11) + δ,
p11 ≤ e(1− p00) + δ.

.
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Furthermore, we denote by R′′ the boundary of R′ which satisfies at least one of inequalities
(11):
R′′ = R′ \
(p00, p11) ∈ R : p00 < e(1− p11) + δ,p11 < e(1− p00) + δ.
 .
The set R′′ therefore consists of the union of two line segments in the unit square, where (11a)
and (11b) are tight.
We are therefore looking to find the RR mechanism which minimises estimator error, while
still being (, δ)-differentially private. Hence, we seek to find
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var
(
Πˆ(p00, p11)
∣∣∣ pi) . (13)
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We begin by presenting two results which will be of use later in the paper. The first result
concerns the non-negativity of a non-linear function on the unit square.
Lemma 1. Let f : R× R→ R be defined by
f(x, y) = 2xy − x− y + 1.
Then, f(x, y) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore,
arg min
x,y∈[0,1]
f(x, y) = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}.
Proof: Let’s first consider minx∈[0,1] f(x, y):
min
x∈[0,1]
f(x, y) = min
x∈[0,1]
(2xy − x)− y + 1
= min
x∈[0,1]
((2y − 1)x)− y + 1
=
y if y ≤
1
2
,
1− y if y > 1
2
.
(14)
It follows that
min
y∈[0,1]
(
min
x∈[0,1]
f(x, y)
)
= 0.
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By symmetry of f , it also follows that
min
x∈[0,1]
(
min
y∈[0,1]
f(x, y)
)
= 0,
hence f(x, y) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ [0, 1].
We note that f(1, 0) = f(0, 1) = 0, and by (14) we see that these values uniquely minimise
f(x, y) for all x, y ∈ [0, 1].
In the second result of this section we prove that an optimal mechanism exists on R′′ (i. e. on
the boundary of R′ where at least one of inequalities (11) is tight), and additionally that when
pi ∈ (0, 1), optimal mechanisms only occur on R′′.
Lemma 2. Let p00 + p11 > 1. Then there exists (p∗00, p∗11) ∈ arg minR′ Var(Πˆ|pi) such that
(p∗00, p
∗
11) ∈ R′′.
Furthermore, when 0 < pi < 1, arg minR′ Var(Πˆ|pi) ⊆ R′′.
Proof: Let’s consider ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p00
and ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
.
Firstly, after some rearranging/manipulation,
∂ Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
= −2p00(1− p00)(1− pi) + pi(2p00p11 − p00 − p11 + 1)
(p00 + p11 − 1)3n .
By Lemma 1, we know that 2p00p11 − p00 − p11 + 1 ≥ 0, and since p00 + p11 − 1 > 0 by
hypothesis, we conclude that ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
≤ 0.
We further note that 2p00p11 − p00 − p11 + 1 > 0 by Lemma 1, since the assumption that
p00 + p11 > 1 means p00, p11 > 0. Hence
∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
= 0 only when pi = 0 and p00 = 1.
Equivalently,
∂ Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
< 0 when pi > 0 or p00 < 1. (15)
Secondly, after some rearranging/manipulation,
∂ Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p00
= −(2p00p11 − p00 − p11 + 1)(1− pi) + 2p11pi(1− p11)
(p00 + p11 − 1)3n .
Since, by assumption, we have 2p00p11 − p00 − p11 + 1 ≥ 0 and since p11 ∈ [0, 1], we see that
∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p00
≤ 0.
Similar to the reasoning above, since 2p00p11 − p00 − p11 + 1 > 0 and p11 > 0, ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)∂p00 = 0
only when pi = 1 and p11 = 1. Equivalently,
∂ Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p00
< 0 when pi < 1 or p11 < 1. (16)
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Since ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p00
≤ 0 and ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
≤ 0, there exists a mechanism on the boundary of R′ which
minimises the estimator error, i. e.
∂R′ ∩
(
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi)
)
6= ∅. (17)
However, if 0 < pi < 1, we see from (15) and (16) that ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p00
< 0 and ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
< 0.
Hence,
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) ⊆ ∂R′, (18)
i. e. the optimal mechanisms only occur on the boundary of R′.
Finally, suppose (p00, p11) ∈ ∂R′, but neither of the inequalities in (11) are tight. Then there
exist ∆0,∆1 ≥ 0, ∆0 + ∆1 > 0 where (p00 + ∆0, p11 + ∆1) ∈ ∂R′, but because ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)∂p00 ≤ 0
and ∂Var(Πˆ|pi)
∂p11
≤ 0, then Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) ≥ Var(Πˆ(p00 + ∆0, p11 + ∆1)|pi). Hence minimal
error is achieved when at least one of the inequalities (11) is tight, i. e.
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) ⊆ R′′.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume pi ∈ (0, 1). Note that the results on optimal
mechanisms still hold for pi ∈ [0, 1], however these optima may not be unique.
V. OPTIMAL MECHANISM FOR -DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
We have already established that the parameters for the optimal (, δ)-differentially private
mechanism lie on R′′. We now examine the case of -differential privacy, where δ = 0, with the
additional assumption that  > 0.
Theorem 2. Let pi ∈ (0, 1), p00 + p11 > 1 and  > 0. The -differentially private RR mechanism
which minimises estimator error is given by the design matrix
P =
 ee+1 1e+1
1
e+1
e
e+1
 .
Proof: By Lemma 2, we know that the parameters (p00, p11) of the optimal mechanism
exist on the boundary of R′, with at least one of the inequalities (11) tight. We now separately
consider the cases where (11a) and (11b) are tight. By hypothesis, δ = 0 and  6= 0.
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1) (11a) tight: p11 = e(1− p00), constrained by p11 ≥ 0 and p00 ≤ e(1− p11). By (11b) and
since p00 = 1− e−p11, we have
ep11 ≤ e − p00
= e − (1− e−p11)
= e − 1 + e−p11,
which we rewrite as
p11(e
 − e−) ≤ e − 1,
and noting that e2 − 1 = (e − 1)(e + 1), we see that
p11 ≤ e
 − 1
e−(e2 − 1)
=
e
e + 1
.
We are therefore considering Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) on the line p00 = 1−e−p11 for 0 ≤ p11 ≤
e
e+1
. We parametrise this line as follows, where 0 < t ≤ 1, p00 = r(t) and p11 = s(t) (we
require t > 0 since p00 + p11 > 1):
r(t) = (1− t) + e

1 + e
t = 1− e−s(t),
s(t) =
e
1 + e
t.
(19)
For simplicity, we let Πˆ(r(t), s(t)) = Πˆ1(t). After some manipulation, we see that
∂ Var(Πˆ1(t)|pi)
∂t
= −(1 + e
)(1 + pi(e − 1))
(e − 1)2t2n ,
and noting that e > 1, we see that ∂Var(Πˆ1(t)|pi)
∂t
< 0. Hence,
arg min
t∈(0,1]
Var(Πˆ1(t)|pi) = {1}. (20)
2) (11b) tight: By symmetry of the equations (11), we simply let p00 = s(t) and p11 = r(t).
By examining (3) and (6), we see that
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|1− pi) = Var(Πˆ(p11, p00)|pi),
and by letting Πˆ(s(t), r(t)) = Πˆ2(t), we get
∂ Var(Πˆ2(t)|pi)
∂t
= −(1 + e
)(1 + (1− pi)(e − 1)
(e − 1)2t2n .
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Again it follows that ∂Var(Πˆ2(t)|pi)
∂t
< 0, and so
arg min
t∈(0,1]
Var(Πˆ2(t)|pi) = {1}. (21)
By (18), (20) and (21), we can now conclude that
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) =
{(
e
e + 1
,
e
e + 1
)}
,
and so the result follows.
Remark: When  = 0, all rows of the design matrix must be identical, i. e. p00 = 1− p11 and
p11 = 1−p00. This gives p00 +p11 = 1, leading to an unbounded estimator error (6). In practical
terms, 0-differential privacy enforces the same output distribution for every respondent, hence
nothing meaningful can be learned.
VI. OPTIMAL MECHANISM FOR (, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Let’s now consider the optimal mechanism for (, δ)-differential privacy. We parametrise R′′
as follows. If we let
rδ(t) =
(
1 + e−δ
)
(1− t) + e
 + δ
e + 1
t,
= 1− e−(sδ(t)− δ),
sδ(t) =
e + δ
e + 1
t,
(22)
for t ∈ [0, 1], then the boundary where (11a) holds is parametrised by p00 = rδ(t) and p11 = sδ(t);
by symmetry, the boundary where (11b) holds is parametrised by p00 = sδ(t) and p11 = rδ(t).
We note that t = 1 denotes an extreme point of R′ (and R′′), the point at which both
inequalities (11) are tight. Here p00 = p11 = rδ(1) = sδ(1) = e
+δ
e+1
.
A. Preliminary Lemmas
Before proceeding to the main result of this section, we first present a collection of lemmas
for later use. The first result states that the minimal variance of Πˆ on R′′ will occur at one of
its extreme points (i. e. at one of the endpoints of the two line segments which comprise R′′).
Lemma 3. Let rδ and sδ be given by (22), let δ > 0 and let a ≤ b ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
arg min
t∈[a,b]
Var(Πˆ(rδ(t), sδ(t))|pi) ⊆ {a, b}.
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Proof: For simplicity, we denote Πˆ(rδ(t), sδ(t)) by Πˆ1,δ(t).
By some manipulation, it can be shown that the numerator of ∂Var(Πˆ1,δ(t)|pi)
∂t
is linear in t,
hence it has at most one root at
t =
δ(1 + e)(2e + 2δ − 1− pi(e + 2δ − 1))
(e + δ)(e + 2δ − 1)(1 + (e − 1)pi) .
By substitution, we find that
∂2 Var(Πˆ1,δ(t)|pi)
∂t2
= −(e
 + δ)2(e + 2δ − 1)4(1 + (e − 1)pi)4
8e2δ3(e + δ − 1)3(1 + e)2n ,
when ∂Var(Πˆ1,δ(t)|pi)
∂t
= 0. By inspection, and since δ > 0, we see that ∂
2 Var(Πˆ1,δ(t)|pi)
∂t2
< 0 when
∂Var(Πˆ1,δ(t)|pi)
∂t
= 0, and so this point is the maximum of Var(Πˆ1,δ(t)|pi). Hence, the minimum of
Var(Πˆ1,δ(t)|pi) cannot occur at a mid-point of an interval. The result follows.
We next show that the error of Πˆ along the boundary constrained by (11a) is uniformly greater
than along the boundary constrained by (11b) when pi ≤ 1
2
.
Lemma 4. Let rδ and sδ be given by (22) and let δ > 0. Then, when pi ≤ 12 ,
Var(Πˆ(rδ(t), sδ(t))|pi) ≤ Var(Πˆ(sδ(t), rδ(t))|pi),
for t ∈ [0, 1].
Conversely, if pi ≥ 1
2
, then
Var(Πˆ(rδ(t), sδ(t))|pi) ≥ Var(Πˆ(sδ(t), rδ(t))|pi),
for t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: After manipulation of the terms, we can show that
Var(Πˆ(rδ(t), sδ(t))|pi)− Var(Πˆ(sδ(t), rδ(t))|pi) = − (e
 + 1)(e + δ)(1− 2pi)(1− t)
(e(e − 1)t+ δ(1− t+ e(1 + t)))n.
We see that 1 − 2pi ≥ 0 when pi ≤ 1
2
, and 1 − 2pi ≤ 0 when pi ≥ 1
2
, and, since t ∈ [0, 1] and
δ > 0, the result follows.
Finally, we present t0(, δ) as the t-value which gives the endpoints of the line segments of
R′′ at the boundary of the unit square.
Lemma 5. Define t0 : R× R→ [0, 1] by
t0(, δ) =
δ(e + 1)
e + δ
,
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then,
(rδ(t0(, δ)), sδ(t0(, δ))) ∈ ∂R′.
Proof: By explicit calculation,
rδ(t0(, δ)) = 1,
sδ(t0(, δ)) = δ.
By definition, it follows that (1, δ) ∈ R′∪∂R′, and since p00 ≤ 1 is a boundary of {(p00, p11) ∈
R′}, it follows that (1, δ) ∈ ∂R′.
Remark: When δ = 0, (rδ(t0(, δ)), sδ(t0(, δ))) /∈ R′, since we require rδ + sδ > 1.
Remark: By linearity, it follows that (rδ(t), sδ(t)) ∈ R′ for all t0(, δ) < t ≤ 1, and that
(rδ(t), sδ(t)) /∈ R′ when t < t0(, δ).
B. Main Result
We now present the main results of this paper, which establish the optimal (, δ)-differentially
private RR mechanism(s). The following results assume δ > 0; the optimal mechanism when
δ = 0 was presented in Theorem 2. Note that we continue to assume pi ∈ (0, 1) to ensure
uniqueness of the optima.
The following theorem establishes the optimal RR mechanism(s) when pi ≤ 1
2
.
Theorem 3. Let δ > 0 and 0 < pi ≤ 1
2
, and define g : R× R→ R by
g(, δ) =
δ(e + δ)
(e + 2δ − 1)2 . (23)
Then, for rδ and sδ given by (22),
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) =

{(rδ(t0), sδ(t0))}, if g(, δ) > pi,
{(rδ(1), sδ(1))}, if g(, δ) < pi,
{(rδ(t0), sδ(t0)), (rδ(1), sδ(1))}, if g(, δ) = pi.
where t0 = t0(, δ).
Proof: By Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, we know that when 0 < pi ≤ 1
2
and δ > 0,
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) ⊆ {(rδ(t0), sδ(t0)), (rδ(1), sδ(1))}.
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We are therefore considering two candidate points, which can be shown to resolve to
rδ(t0) = 1, sδ(t0) = δ,
rδ(1) =
e + δ
e + 1
, sδ(1) =
e + δ
e + 1
.
We are therefore seeking to determine the sign of
Var(Πˆ(1, δ)|pi)− Var
(
Πˆ
(
e + δ
e + 1
,
e + δ
e + 1
)∣∣∣∣ pi) . (24)
After some manipulation, we can show that (24) simplifies to
(1− δ)(pi(e + 2δ − 1)− δ(e + δ))
δ(e + 2δ − 1)2n ,
and we note that its denominator is strictly positive since δ > 0. Note additionally that (24)
simplifies to zero when δ = 1, which is trivial since r1(t0) = s1(t0) = r1(1) = s1(1) = 1.
The sign of (24) is therefore determined by the sign of pi(e + 2δ − 1) − δ(e + δ), which
gives g(, δ) when solved for pi. Hence, Var(Πˆ(rδ(t0), sδ(t0))|pi) < Var(Πˆ(rδ(1), sδ(1))|pi) when
g(, δ) > pi. The other results follow similarly.
Remark: When g(, δ) ≤ pi, the optimal mechanism corresponds with that established for -
differential privacy on RR (with an added dependence for δ) and also with the optimal mechanism
established in Theorem 10 of [15] for mechanisms on categorical data. However, when g(, δ) >
pi, the optimal mechanism is one which we have not encountered previously.
The next corollary establishes the optimal mechanism(s) when pi ≥ 1
2
, and follows from
Theorem 3 by the symmetry of Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) in p00 and p11.
Corollary 2. Let δ > 0 and 1
2
≤ pi < 1. Then, for rδ and sδ given by (22) and g given by (23),
arg min
(p00,p11)∈R′
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) =

{(sδ(t0), rδ(t0))}, if g(, δ) > 1− pi,
{(sδ(1), rδ(1))}, if g(, δ) < 1− pi,
{(sδ(t0), rδ(t0)), (sδ(1), rδ(1))}, if g(, δ) = 1− pi,
where t0 = t0(, δ).
Proof: The result follows from Theorem 3 since
Var(Πˆ(p00, p11)|pi) = Var(Πˆ(p11, p00)|1− pi).
18
Example 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the conclusion of Theorem 3.
Example 1. Consider Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 for various values of , δ and pi. For simplicity,
in each of these examples we set n = 1.
1)  = 1
2
, δ = 1
10
, pi = 1
4
: In this case, we have g(, δ) = 0.243 < pi. Hence, the design matrix
of the optimal mechanism is denoted by e+δe+1 1−δe+1
1−δ
e+1
e+δ
e+1
 .
This can be verified by noting that Var(Πˆ(rδ(1), sδ(1))|pi) = 2.372 and Var(Πˆ(rδ(t0), sδ(t0))|pi) =
2.438.
2)  = 1, δ = 2
5
, pi = 1
10
: In this case, g(, δ) = 0.197 > pi. Hence, the design matrix of the
optimal mechanism is denoted by  1 0
1− δ δ
 .
Again, this can be verified by noting that Var(Πˆ(rδ(1), sδ(1))|pi) = 0.385 and Var(Πˆ(rδ(t0), sδ(t0))|pi) =
0.24.
3)  = 1
2
, δ = 1
3
, pi = 9
10
: Since pi ≥ 1
2
, we use Corollary 2 for this example. We note that
g(, δ) = 0.382 > 1 − pi. Hence, the design matrix of the optimal mechanism is denoted
by  δ 1− δ
0 1
 .
We see that Var(Πˆ(sδ(1), rδ(1))|pi) = 0.854 and Var(Πˆ(sδ(t0), rδ(t0))|pi) = 0.143. Note
also that Var(Πˆ(rδ(0), sδ(0))|pi) = 1.911, corresponding with the conclusion of Lemma 4
4)  = ln(2), δ = 1
4
, pi = 1
4
: In this case, we have g(, δ) = 1
4
= pi, hence there are two
optimal mechanisms,  e+δe+1 1−δe+1
1−δ
e+1
e+δ
e+1
 ,
 1 0
1− δ δ
 .
This can be verified by noting that Var(Πˆ(rδ(1), sδ(1))|pi) = Var(Πˆ(rδ(t0), sδ(t0))|pi) = 1516 .
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Fig. 1. A contour plot of various level sets of g(, δ). Given pi,  and δ, these level sets can be used to determine the optimal
(, δ)-differentially private RR mechanism.
VII. OPTIMAL WARNER MECHANISM FOR (, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In the final result of this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism for Warner’s RR mecha-
nism. We recall that Warner’s mechanism imposed the additional constraint that p00 = p11 = pw,
so the design matrix becomes  pw 1− pw
1− pw pw
 .
The error of such a mechanism is only a function of pw and the population proportion pi, as
shown in (8).
As before, we require 2pw > 1. Our region of feasibility is therefore
Rw =
(
1
2
,
e + δ
e + 1
]
.
Theorem 4. Consider Warner’s RR mechanism as presented in Section II-D. Then,
arg min
pw∈Rw
Var(Πˆw(pw)|pi) =
{
e + δ
e + 1
}
.
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Proof: By (8), we note that
∂ Var(Πˆw(pw)|pi)
∂pw
=
1
(1− 2pw)3n,
hence ∂Var(Πˆw(pw)|pi)
∂pw
< 0 when pw > 12 . Therefore,
arg min
pw∈Rw
Var(Πˆw(pw)|pi) = max(Rw),
and the result follows.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the optimal differentially private RR mechanisms with respect to a max-
imum likelihood estimator, where both strict and relaxed differential privacy were considered.
For a given desired level of privacy, as determined by  and δ, we presented a method to quickly
determine the optimal mechanism. This will allow for the optimal implementation of differential
privacy in any randomised response survey.
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